Chinese President Xi Jinping’s bold pledge to build a “world-class military” by 2027 has been one of the defining themes of his decade in power. The slogan is designed to impress, and is backed by pompous parades showcasing hypersonic missiles, publicity videos of aircraft carriers at sea, and speeches that cast the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) as the spearpoint of China’s rise.
Behind this spectacle, however, the picture is far less tidy. The PLA is still grappling with the same structural weaknesses that have dogged it for years. There is corruption in the ranks, uneven quality in its equipment, and deep-seated training deficiencies. The gap between Xi’s ambition and the military’s reality is proving increasingly difficult to hide.
Grand Ambitions Meet Harsh Realities
The choice of 2027 as a milestone was deliberate. It marks the PLA’s centenary and was meant to accelerate a longer-term roadmap that originally stretched to 2035 and then 2049. By setting the 2027 deadline, Xi signalled that China expected to have a force by 2027 capable of deterring, if not directly confronting, the United States and its allies.
But even Chinese officials admit that progress is uneven. PLA assessments regularly reference the so-called “two inadequate capabilities”— an inability to fully meet China’s security needs and to fight modern wars— and the “significant gaps” between the PLA and the world’s advanced militaries. These are unusually frank acknowledgements for Beijing, and they reveal how much distance still separates aspiration from reality.
The sheer pace of modernisation has also created its own problems. Pouring resources into new systems is easier than building the institutional culture, technical expertise, and reliability that make them effective in war. This is why the 2027 goal, for all its fanfare, risks becoming less a demonstration of power than an exposure of weaknesses.
Corruption: The Cancer Within the Dragon’s Army
The biggest blow dealt to Xi’s military modernisation ambitions so far has come from the rampant corruption that has not spared a single level of the PLA hierarchy. Since 2023, at least 15 high-ranking military officers and defence industry executives, including three defence ministers, have been removed from their posts one after the other.
The graft has not remained contained to the defence and security establishment. The removal of Admiral Miao Hua, head of the Central Military Commission’s Political Work Department, signals that the anti-corruption campaign has broadened beyond equipment procurement to arch over political loyalty as well. As officers hand-picked by him face investigation, Xi’s distrust of his own military leadership continues to grow.
The corruption is not your garden variety of funds embezzlement. The people in positions of power and influence had become audacious enough to siphon off enough money that missiles in the PLA Rocket Force, China’s strategic nuclear arm had to be filled with water instead of fuel. Reports suggest that missile silos were improperly constructed, fundamentally compromising China’s nuclear deterrent capabilities. The picture painted with these revelations could not have been clearers: corruption has directly undermined the technical effectiveness of some of China’s most critical military systems.
Substandard Equipment: The Hidden Cost Of Rapid Expansion
The spillover from this embarrassing spate of crackdowns is global in nature. China’s defence exports provide a telling indicator. The quality issues plaguing its military-industrial complex are now documented not only in reports, but in the very behaviour of arms-importing nations.
Chinese arms exports declined 7.8 per cent between 2016 and 2020. Beijing’s market share of the global arms industry also shrank from 5.6 to 5.2 per cent. This decline stems from international customers having experienced equipment failures that have left them questioning Chinese military technology.
Chinese CH-4 unmanned aerial vehicles in Algeria’s possession witnessed numerous crashes during testing. Bangladesh reported ammunition firing problems with Chinese K-8W aircraft that caused pilot fatalities. Within the short span of a decade, Nigeria lost three of its twelve Chinese F-7 aircraft to crashes, forcing the return of seven remaining aircraft to China for extensive maintenance.
Pakistan’s Chinese-made F-22P frigates suffered from defective infrared sensors and radars, rendering them unable to fire missiles effectively.
These international failures reflect broader systemic problems in China’s defence manufacturing. The emphasis on rapid production and cost-cutting has compromised quality control, resulting in equipment that appears impressive on paper but fails under operational conditions.
Training Deficiencies: The Human Factor
Despite technological investments, the PLA continues struggling with fundamental training inadequacies that limit its combat effectiveness. Chinese military training has historically been “widely dismissed as infrequent, unrealistic and overly scripted”. PLA Air Force pilots flew insufficient hours annually, with limited training being heavily scripted and unrealistic.
Professional military education reforms have attempted to address these shortcomings, but progress remains slow. The need for qualified personnel capable of operating high-technology systems in joint operations environments far exceeds current capabilities.
Strategic Implications for India and Regional Response
For India, China’s military modernisation challenges present both threats and opportunities. The corruption scandals and equipment failures suggest that China’s military capabilities may be less formidable than officially proclaimed. However, this should not lead to complacency, as China’s absolute spending levels and technological investments continue advancing despite internal problems.
India must pursue a comprehensive counter-strategy that leverages China’s vulnerabilities whilst strengthening its own capabilities. This includes accelerating indigenous defence production through initiatives like ‘Make in India’ and ‘Atmanirbhar Bharat’. India should prioritise technological collaboration with reliable partners, streamline defence procurement processes, and invest heavily in research and development.